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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3842 
 ___________ 
 
 CLARENCE GLENN, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-01520) 
 District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 22, 2010 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: January 4, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Clarence Glenn, an inmate at the State Correctional Institute at Frackville, 
Pennsylvania, appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing sua sponte his pro se 
civil rights complaint as frivolous.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm. 
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 For the purposes of our review, we take the following facts from Glenn’s 
complaint as true.  In November 2008, Glenn sought credit against his sentence for the 
time between March 4, 1992, and October 12, 1993.  This request was denied.  He 
appealed to the Parole Board, but was unsuccessful.  He appealed to the Commonwealth 
Court, which granted and the Parole Board’s motion to remand in order to credit Glenn 
with 411 days against his sentence.  According to Glenn, this would have resulted in his 
immediate release.  However, instead of releasing him, the Parole Board increased 
Glenn’s sentence by 411 days, extending his period of incarceration to April 27, 2011.  
Glenn sought a writ of mandamus from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but his petition 
was denied. 
 Glenn filed a complaint in the District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He 
alleged that he was being incarcerated beyond his original sentence in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and sought compensatory and punitive damages.  He 
did not seek to hasten his release from prison.  The District Court concluded that Glenn’s 
claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and that amending the 
complaint would be futile, and it dismissed the complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Glenn moved to alter or amend the judgment, but the District 
Court denied the motion. 
 Glenn appealed.  We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.  42 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review the District Court's § 1915(e) dismissal without leave to amend for abuse of 
discretion.  Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, (1992).  To the extent that the District 
Court engaged in the choice, application, and interpretation of the law, our review is 
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plenary.  Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir.1995).  Finally, we may 
summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a substantial 
issue.  L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical 
confinement [. . .] his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”  Presier v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).  A prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 claim “for 
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by 
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless he or 
she can show a favorable termination of the prior criminal proceeding.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 
486-87.  In other words, if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply 
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” then a § 1983 action will not lie.  Id. at 487.  
This analysis also applies to parole determinations.  Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 
177 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 For substantially the reasons given by the District Court, we conclude that Heck 
bars Glenn’s action.  Were we to agree with Glenn that he has been imprisoned beyond 
the expiration of his sentence, that would necessarily imply that the Parle Board has 
incorrectly determined his release date or has failed to timely release him.  Because no 
court has so held, Glenn’s action is barred by Heck.1
Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, and we 
   
                                                 
1  Glenn argues that the Commonwealth Court’s decision to remand the case 
constituted a “favorable termination.”  However, it was the Parole Board’s subsequent 
decision on remand—that Glenn’s sentence be increased, instead of decreased, by 411 
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will affirm the decision of the District Court. 
                                                                                                                                                             
days—that, according to Glenn, resulted in his alleged incarceration beyond the sentence 
imposed by the court.   
